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TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA AND THE NEWLY
INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Mun-Chow Lai* and Su-Fei Yap**
Taking the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China
as the reference economies for comparison, the study focuses on the policy
lessons for Malaysia in pursuing technology-based economic growth.  The
key elements examined are human capital, research and development
(R&D), science and technology (S&T) parks, foreign technology transfer
and government research institutes (GRIs).  The analysis shows that the
availability of skilled human capital in Malaysia is not sufficient for
technological development to progress.  The paper makes a number of
recommendations to promote technological development in Malaysia.
Malaysia is an emerging Asian economy aspiring to move towards
a technology-driven and high-tech production-based pattern of development and thus
replicate the experience of the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of Asia.  In
fact, Malaysia has been categorized in the group of countries that have the potential
to create new technologies on their own (Mani, 2000).  The prospects remain promising
despite the 1997 Asian financial crisis, although no country in the region was spared.
The rapid technological development of the NIEs over the past two decades
has caught the attention of both developing and developed economies (Hobday, 1995).
Coincidentally, Malaysia and the NIEs are not only located in the same region, but to
a large extent have similar economic regimes and trade structures.  In view of that,
Malaysia has a strong basis to consider formulating its own technological development
strategy based on those in the NIEs with appropriate adaptations to accommodate the
economy’s uniqueness.
Nevertheless, it is non-optimal for Malaysia to import wholesale
a technological development model from any of the NIEs.  Given that each of these
economies used dissimilar technological development routes to make their way into
high-tech markets, this suggests that there is no single strategy that can guarantee
successful technological upgrading in Malaysia.  Clearly, their patterns of technological
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development would need to be adapted in order for Malaysia to make the best use of
them.  Drawing upon their successful experience in pursuing technology-based
economic growth, the object of this study is to come up with policy lessons for
Malaysia.  The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section I comprises the
methodology, followed by section II that analyses and contrasts the technological
catch-up strategies and the strategic resources that are currently being used by Malaysia
and the NIEs.  Finally, sections III and IV provide the policy lessons and overall
conclusions, respectively.
I.  METHODOLOGY – AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The NIEs that are taken as the reference countries for comparison are the
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China.  The two main objectives
of the comparative study are, firstly, the technological catch-up strategies within the
context of their national technological innovation systems; and, secondly, the strategic
resources that have been utilized in the course of their technological upgrading.
Technological catch-up strategy
The strategic dimension to be used for analysing the technological catch-up
strategies of Malaysia and the NIEs is the technological development capability of the
latecomer firms with the resource-based view.  The technological capabilities of
a firm can be conceptualized as having product technological capabilities and process
technological capabilities1 (Wong, 1999).  The resource-based view suggests that the
superior performance of a firm is derived from its pursuit of strategies that best
exploit its unique resource position.  Considering that strategic resources are
heterogeneously distributed across firms and that these differences are stable over
time, there is a link between firm resources and sustained competitive advantage.
One needs to delineate the unique resource positions of these firms in order to
understand why certain latecomer firms are able to achieve rapid technological
catch-up (Barney, 1991).
Strategic resources
The strategic resources to be analysed are as follows:  human capital, R&D,
S&T parks, foreign technology transfer and GRIs.  The success of a nation’s
technological development hinges on the planned use of these strategic resources and
the formulation of policies and their implementation at the national level.  Two caveats
1 Product technological capabilities cover the abilities to create, design and commercialize new products
and services whereas process technological capabilities cover the abilities to make multiple copies of
a product or to deliver repeatedly a service once the product or service performance specifications are given.
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are in order.  First, data are compiled from various national and international official
publications and thus may not be strictly comparable.  The latter include the Human
Development Report (HDR), the World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) and the
World Development Report (WDR).  Second, some data series do not cover complete
periods and missing data have to be estimated to compile a series.
II.  ANALYSIS
Technological catch-up strategy
Both Malaysia and the NIEs have mounted elaborate strategies to identify
and act upon strategic technologies (Dodgson, 2000; Chang and Cheema, 2001).  They
have used trade and domestic credit policies to different extents and in different
combinations to influence resource allocation, infrastructure development, firm size
and cluster formation, skill development, technological activity and FDI attraction, to
build local technological capabilities (Lall and Teubal, 1998).  Also, national technology
development plans have been formulated to systematically guide their nations to match
the technologically advanced economies.
While the national innovation model of Malaysia remains elusive, the one in
the Republic of Korea is characterized by large and vertically integrated conglomerates
(chaebol).  Meanwhile, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China are seen to be
following the small- and medium-sized enterprise-public research institute (SME-PRI)
innovation network model and the foreign direct investment (FDI)-leveraging model,
respectively (see table 1).  Over the years, Malaysia has attempted to emulate the
three models but none of these has produced significant results thus far.
If development proceeds by stages, Taiwan Province of China should have
preceded the Republic of Korea into high-tech production.  In fact, the Republic of
Korea has now overtaken Taiwan Province of China in many respects.  This can be
traced principally to differences in industrial and firm structures in the two countries.
The conglomerate organizational mode of the Republic of Korea accelerates entry
into many markets while the smaller Taiwan Province of China firms have been unable
to sustain themselves in these markets (Mody, 1990).
Nevertheless, technological development in the Republic of Korea has its
downside (Ernst, 2000).  A fundamental problem of its industries, especially electronics,
is the narrow and sticky product specialization on segments that require huge investment
outlays and sophisticated mass production techniques for homogeneous products.  Also,
its narrow domestic industrial technological knowledge base remains constrained by
an insufficient critical mass of R&D and patenting, inefficiency of corporate technology
management and an ineffective technological innovation system in the public domain.
Singapore’s FDI-leveraging model strongly pushes into the specialized
high-tech industry for export markets and subcontracting promotion for SMEs to raise
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local content.  Besides, there is an aggressive targeting and screening of multinational
corporations (MNCs) to direct them into high value added and R&D intensive activities
(Lall and Teubal, 1998; Wong, 1999).  More often than not, its success lies in the
capability of SMEs in engineering positive spillovers from MNCs.
The NIEs today share common structural characteristics in technology because
they made use of the same sources of FDI, notably the United States and Japan, in the
early stage of their technological development.  However, only the Republic of Korea
has successfully deepened and broadened its technology base, not only in the electronics
industry, but also in the automobile, shipbuilding and steel industries.  Meanwhile, to
date, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China have only become the forerunners in
the electronics industry.  This can be arguably attributed to the difference in the role
of Government.  Taiwan Province of China’s Government has been supportive rather
than interventionist whereas the Republic of Korea’s Government has been collaborative
and even coercive in relations with the private sector (Yung, 1990).
Strategic resources
Human capital
Compared to the NIEs, Malaysia’s human capital is relatively scarce and less
qualified (Mani, 2000).  Table 2 shows that both the education index and human
resources ranking of Malaysia were relatively low in comparison with those of the
NIEs in 1990 and 2000.  Also, both the literacy rate and enrolment ratio of Malaysia
have trailed behind the NIEs over the past two decades (see tables 3-6).  However,
Table 1.   National innovation models of the NIEs
National innovation system models Dominant technological catch-up routes
Republic of Korea’s large firm • Reverse product life cycle strategy
internalization model
Singapore’s FDI-leveraging model • Process specialist strategy, followed by reverse
value chain strategy on a smaller scale
• Application pioneering strategy strong among
service firms
• Emergence of reverse product life cycle strategy
and product pioneering strategy in the 1990s
Taiwan Province of China’s SME-PRI • Reverse value chain strategy, followed by process
innovation network model specialist strategy
• Strong emergence of product pioneering strategy
since the late 1980s
Source: Wong (1999).
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during the period, Malaysia progressed quite rapidly in terms of both youth and
adult literacy rates.  In fact, this is somewhat in line with Lau’s (2000) findings
(see table 7).
Table 2.  Education index (EI) and
human resources ranking (HRR)
EI HRR*
1990 2000 1990 2000
Republic of Korea 0.92 0.95 66.7 67.9
Singapore 0.83 0.87 68.3 70.7
Taiwan Province of n.a. n.a. 67.1 69.0
   China
Malaysia 0.75 0.80 63.4 66.5
Sources: HDR, WCY* (various issues).
Table 3.  Percentage of 20-24 year
olds enrolled in tertiary education
1990 2000
Republic of Korea 37  43
Singapore  18 53
Taiwan Province of China* 22 52
Malaysia  7 13
Sources: WCY (various issues), NSF*.
Table 4.  Youth literacy rate,
ages 15-24
 2000 Index
(1985=100)
Republic of Korea 99.8 100
Singapore  99.7 102
Taiwan Province of n.a. n.a.
    China
Malaysia  97.3 105
Source: HDR (2002).
Table 5.  Combined primary,
tertiary gross enrolment ratio
1990 2000
Republic of Korea 81  90
Singapore 68 75
Taiwan Province of China  n.a. n.a.
Malaysia 61 66
Source: HDR (various issues).
Table 6.  Adult literacy as percentage,
ages 15 and above
1990 2000
Republic of Korea 97.6 97.8
Singapore  90.3  92.3
Taiwan Province of China n.a.  n.a.
Malaysia  82.2  87.5
Source: HDR (various issues).
Table 7.  Average annual rates of
human capital growth
Period Growth rate
Republic of Korea 1960-95 6.2
Singapore 1964-95 5.9
Taiwan Province of China 1953-95 5.3
Malaysia 1970-95 7.7
Source: Lau (2000).
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As shown in tables 8-10, the technical enrolment as a percentage of all
secondary students, S&T graduates as a percentage of all graduates and engineering
enrolments as a percentage of the population in Malaysia trailed significantly
behind the NIEs over the past 10 years.  With such poor S&T enrolment numbers,
the research scientists and engineers (RSEs) per 10,000 labour force in Malaysia
were not surprisingly outnumbered almost 15 to one by the NIEs during the period
(see table 11).  Also, it is worrisome that Malaysia is still very short of S&T human
resources despite the increasing number of S&T degree holders from the local
educational institutions during the period 1971-2000 (see table 12).  This suggests
that demand has actually outstripped supply.  The other side of the coin is that
technology development in Malaysia has been so rapid that even the incremental
increase in S&T human resources supply fails to meet the demand.  Nonetheless,
findings suggest an undesirable imbalance in terms of RSEs in Malaysia.
Table 8.  Technical enrolment as
percentage of all secondary students
1988-1991 2000
Republic of Korea 18.6 18.6
Singapore  n.a.  5.6
Taiwan Province of China n.a. n.a.
Malaysia  2.2  2.2
Source: HDR (various issues).
Table 9.  S&T graduates as
percentage of all graduates
1990 2000
Republic of Korea  42 44
Singapore 53 63
Taiwan Province of China* 48 56
Malaysia 32 39
Sources: HDR (various issues), NSF*.
Table 10.  Engineering enrolment
as percentage of population
1990 2000
Republic of Korea 0.46 0.68
Singapore  0.45 0.65
Taiwan Province of China  0.51 0.70
Malaysia  0.02 0.16
Source: WDR (various issues).
Table 11.  Research scientists and
engineers per 10,000 labour force
1990 2000
Republic of Korea  53 45
Singapore 30 85
Taiwan Province of China* 31 80
Malaysia 2 10
Sources: HDR (various issues), NSF*.
Soon (1992), Mani (2000) and Lall (2001) explain that Singapore has arguably
one of the most well-developed systems of industrial and vocational training that has
enabled the rapid transformation of its unskilled workforce into a highly skilled one
over a short period of two decades.  Interestingly, as shown in table 13, there is not
much difference between the training and skills development in all of these countries
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except for the composition of the coordinating body, in which Singapore is more
private sector driven and governed.  Most specialized technical training programmes
are run as a collaborative venture with reputed overseas partners, either in the form of
well-known MNCs or highly regarded industrial training institutes.  In addition,
Singapore has also successfully adopted a very liberal immigration policy to attract
foreign scientists and engineers to work in the island State.
Table 12.  Malaysia:  output of S&T degree holders from
local institutions
1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
Science 4 451 6 513 9 317 17 510 19 642  40 077
(per cent) (31.8) (33.5)  (34.7) (33.1) (24.8)  (27.8)
Technical 498 1 566  2 719 7 550 10 508  21 953
(per cent) (3.6) (8.1) (10.1) (14.3) (13.3)  (15.2)
Total 4 949 8 079 12 036 25 060 30 150 62 030
(per cent) (35.4)  (41.6) (44.8) (47.4) (38.1)  (43.0)
Source: Five-Year Malaysia Plan (various issues).
Note: Science includes medicine, agricultural sciences and pure sciences; technical includes
engineering, architecture and surveying.
Table 13.  Training and skills development in Malaysia and the NIEs
Incentives for in-service Coordinating body for Composition of
training vocational training coordinating body
Republic of Korea Tax levied on firms Vocational training and Government led, limited
failing to train required management agency autonomy from Ministry
proportion of workforce of Labour
Singapore Levy-subsidy Institute of Technical Governors drawn from
Education  industry, labour
organizations and
government
Taiwan Province Subsidy from general Employment and Government body, some
   of China taxation vocational training informal consultation
administration with industry
Malaysia Levy-subsidy (large Technical and vocational Government body
firms); double deduction division of the Ministry
of training expenses for of Education
tax purposes (others)
Source: Tzannatos and Johnes (1997).
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If one measures a country’s human capital by public education expenditure,
Malaysia was actually on par with the NIEs, if not outperforming them, over the past
two decades (see tables 14-15).  As pointed out by Mani (2002), if one goes by
standard indicators of the Government’s commitment towards human capital efforts,
Malaysia compares very favourably with the NIEs and indeed even with developed
countries, such as Japan and the United States.
Table 14.  Public education
expenditure as percentage of
Government expenditure
1985-1987  1995-1897
Republic of Korea  n.a. 17.5
Singapore 11.5 23.3
Taiwan Province of China  n.a. n.a.
Malaysia 18.8 15.4
Source: HDR (various issues).
Table 15.  Public education
expenditure as percentage of GNP
1985-1987 1995-1997
Republic of Korea 3.8 3.7
Singapore 3.9 3.0
TaiwanProvince of China* 2.1 5.7
Malaysia 6.9 4.9
Sources: HDR, UNESCO* (various issues).
The order of priority in the budget allocations for primary, secondary and
tertiary levels in the NIEs is not the same (see table 16).  This suggests that public
education expenditure by level is not crucial for human capital development.  After
all, these three levels of education are equally important as none of them is dispensable
in the course of human capital formation.
As the output of degree courses shows a continued preference for arts and
humanities, the increase of human capital that has the right quality and knowledge in
Malaysia is not sufficient for technological upgrading to become self-sustaining.  While
such human capital can be augmented via domestic initiatives, these efforts have been
Table 16.  Public education expenditure by level as percentage of all levels
Pre-primary
Primary  
Secondary Tertiary
1985-1986  1995-1997  1985-1986 1995-1997  1985-1986 1995-1997
Republic of Korea  47.0  45.3  36.7  36.6 10.9  8.0
Singapore  30.5  25.7  36.9  34.6 27.9  34.8
Taiwan Province of  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a
   China
Malaysia  37.8  32.7  37.1  30.6 14.6  25.5
Source: HDR (various issues).
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partly offset by the brain drain problem.  Although this is not insurmountable, the fact
that all countries in the region are competing head-on for this scarce intangible capital
will pose a challenge to Malaysia’s S&T human capital growth.  Therefore, Malaysia
needs to come up with a set of liberal immigration policies to attract more foreign
scientists and engineers to work in the country.
Research and development
With a gross expenditure on R&D (GERD)/GDP of less than 0.5 per cent
during the period 1990-2000, certainly Malaysia’s R&D investment was considered as
insignificant (see table 17).  The number of patents granted to Malaysia in the United
States was also quite small during the period (see table 18).  The number would be
even smaller if the patents granted to the MNCs that operate in Malaysia had not
been included.  The two common internal factors that limit R&D activities in Malaysia
are insufficient financial resources and lack of skilled R&D personnel.  Inadequate
market research has also been cited as an important external factor that greatly curtails
R&D activities in the private sector.  Lack of emphasis on the importance of R&D for
long-term benefit also seems to have impeded higher growth of R&D activities in the
GRIs and institutes of higher learning (IHLs) (MoSTE, 2000).
Table 17.  GERD/GDP, 1990-2000
1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000
Republic of Korea  1.90  2.03  2.44  2.60  2.55  2.69
Singapore  0.90  0.97  1.13  1.45  1.76  1.92
Taiwan Province of China  1.70  1.75  1.82  1.88  1.98  1.96
Malaysia  0.37  0.37  0.34  0.22  0.39  0.49
Source: MoSTE (2002).
Table 18.  Patents granted in the United States, 1990-2000
Pre-1986  1990 1992  1994  1996 1998 2000
Republic of Korea  213  225  538  943 1 493  3 259 3 314
Singapore  62  12  32  51  88  120 144
Taiwan Province of China  742  732  1 001  1 443 1 897  3 100 4 667
Malaysia  0  3  5  10  12  23  30
Source: United States Patent and Trade-Mark Office (2002).
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Surprisingly, while the number of patents granted in Malaysia was much
smaller than the ones in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, it was
significantly larger than the one in Singapore, especially during the period 1992-1996
(see table 19).  This implies that countries that leverage foreign sources for
technological upgrading tend to be less successful in promoting local patenting
activities.  Also, an NIE that records higher GERD/GDP does not necessarily indicate
that it has a larger patent intensity.  For instance, during the period 1990-2000, the
Republic of Korea’s GERD/GDP was significantly higher than second-placed Taiwan
Province of China but the number of patents granted to the former in the United
States was smaller than to the latter.
Table 19.  Patents granted locally, 1990-2000
1990  1992  1994  1996 1998  2000
Republic of Korea 7 930 8 308  8 457 11 835 9 579 10 475
Singapore  40  44  58  91  130  285
Taiwan Province of China  22 601 21 264  19 011  29 707 25 386 26 958
Malaysia  518  1 002  1 629  1 801  586  350
Source: United States Patent and Trade-Mark Office (2002).
Bloom (1992), Kim (1995) and Kim (1997) attribute this paradox to the
weaknesses that lurk in the chaebol’s innovation management system.  While the
Republic of Korea’s external technology sourcing strategies are highly sophisticated,
the organization of innovation within these firms follows a centralized R&D
model that produces rigid procedures concerning information management and
decision-making, product design cycles and speed-to-market.  This would inevitably
result in weak domestic linkages, either with foreign companies or what can be
internalized by the chaebol.
In terms of sector-wise distribution, the R&D expenditure in both Malaysia
and the NIEs is not equally distributed.  Throughout the period 1990-2000, the lion’s
share of the R&D expenditure went to the private sector while both the GRIs and
IHLs held only a moderate and very low share, respectively (see table 20).  The R&D
role of private enterprise is expected to be increasingly important, eclipsing both
GRIs and IHLs in the future.
While several research grants and tax incentives are offered in Malaysia and
the NIEs to promote R&D activities in their respective countries (see table 21), most
R&D schemes in the former are offered only to the locally controlled and owned
companies (at least 51 per cent local equity holding).  Obviously, this is a disincentive
for foreign-owned companies to carry out R&D activities in Malaysia.  Consequently,
foreign R&D investment remains low in the country and it was exceeded by about six
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to four by local R&D investment during the period 1990-2000.  While such
a shareholding restriction has also been implicitly imposed on some of the R&D
schemes offered in the NIEs, locally incorporated companies are defined as those
which have a substantial connection to their economies and substantial parts of their
Table 20.  R&D expenditure by sector
(in per cent), 1990-2000
Private sector GRIs IHLs
1990  2000  1990 2000 1990 2000
Republic of Korea 71  75  22 15  8 10
Singapore 54  63  15 19  31 18
Taiwan Province of China 67  73  24 14 9  13
Malaysia 37  66  55 22  8  12
Sources: Ministry of Science and Technology (Republic of Korea), Executive Yuan Council (Taiwan
Province of China), National Science and Technology Board (Singapore) and Ministry of
Science, Technology and the Environment (Malaysia).
Table 21.  Key research grants and projects provision
Republic of Korea • 21st century Frontier R&D Programme
• Highly Advanced National Project
• Creative Research Initiative
• National Research Laboratory Programme
• Strategic National R&D Project
Singapore • Research Incentive Scheme for Companies
• Innovation Development Scheme
• Funds for Industrial Clusters
• Promising Local Enterprises
Taiwan Province of China • Leading Product Subsidiary Programme
• Technology Development Programme
• Small Business and Innovation Research Programme
• Industrial Technological Development Programme
Malaysia • Industry Research and Development Grant
• Technology Acquisition Fund
• Intensification of Research in Priority Areas
• Commercialization of R&D Fund
Sources: Ministry of Science and Technology (Republic of Korea), Ministry of Economic Affairs
(Taiwan Province of China), National Science and Technology Board (Singapore), Ministry
of Science, Technology and the Environment (Malaysia).
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production, R&D, management or general business activities are located in the host
countries.
The R&D expenditure by type of research in Malaysia is dissimilar to that in
the NIEs.  While most research in the NIEs is concentrated on experimental
development, the biggest portion of the R&D expenditure in Malaysia is used for
applied research.  Meanwhile, basic research constitutes the smallest portion of the
total R&D expenditure in both Malaysia and the NIEs.  This suggests that they all
mainly focus on a particular application or use rather than to increase the general
knowledge base.  According to Wong (1999), while applied research can solve the
current and immediate future needs of industry today, only basic research capabilities
can provide more radical or breakthrough solutions.
In the NIEs, most government R&D research funds are given to the electronics
manufacturing industry, the largest contributor in their national GDPs.  In contrast to
the NIEs, the R&D expenditure by field of research in Malaysia is not in accordance
with the importance of the economic sectors.  For instance, while the share of the
agricultural sector to GDP dropped from 18 per cent in 1990 to 8 per cent in 2000,
the bulk of IRPA (the largest government R&D grant scheme) still went to this sunset
sector.  While the share of the manufacturing sector to the GDP increased from 25 per
cent to 35 per cent during this period, its percentage spending in IRPA was merely
one third of that disbursed to the agricultural sector (see table 22).  This is worrisome
as manufacturing is the sector that has been driving the nation towards being
a high-tech exporter in the world (see table 23).  As shown in table 24, the high-tech
exports of Malaysia have indeed been improving tremendously over the past 10 years.
Considering that both Malaysia and the NIEs are heavily dependent on electronics
exports, there is little reason for the former not to follow the same strategy in terms
of R&D budgetary allocation.
Malaysia’s R&D productivity remains low as capital expenditure constitutes
a larger share than labour costs in R&D expenditure by type of costs.  During the
period 1990-2000, capital expenditure accounted for over 40 per cent of the total
R&D expenditure in Malaysia whereas it constituted not more than 25 per cent in the
NIEs.  While labour costs accounted for less than 20 per cent of the total R&D
expenditure in Malaysia, in the NIEs they hovered at around 40 per cent.
Among the NIEs, Taiwan Province of China is the only economy that has
successfully used R&D consortia to enhance its R&D capability (Mathews, 1999).
Such consortia are a series of collaborative R&D ventures that exist within a distinctive
institutional framework.  Technological learning, upgrading and catch-up are the main
objectives of the collaborative exercises.  As explained by Hou and Gee (1993) and
Lin (1994), with relatively small budgets, such alliances bring together firms and
public sector research institutes, with the input of trade associations and financial
assistance from the Government.  They span many industries, target several specific
technologies and vary in size.
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Table 22.  Malaysia:  IRPA programme approvals by area
of research
Area  US$ million  Percentage
 1991-1995
Agricultural sciences 111.6  49.2
Applied sciences and technologies 68.1  30.0
Medical sciences  20.0  8.8
Others  27.2  12.0
Total 226.9 100.0
1996-2000
Agro industry  49.6  25.6
Construction  6.6  3.4
Energy  14.9  5.3
Environment  13.1  6.7
ICT  9.7  5.0
Manufacturing  19.9  10.3
Medical  26.9  13.9
Material and geoscience  4.2  2.1
Science engineering  31.8  16.4
Services  15.0  2.1
Socio-economic  4.2  2.3
Biotechnology  8.0  4.1
Photonics  5.2  2.7
Total 209.1 100.0
Source: Five-Year Malaysia Plan (various issues).
Note: It has been reclassified in the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000).
Table 23.  Percentage share of high-tech exports to total
manufactured exports
WDR  UNU/INTECH
1990 2000  2000
Republic of Korea  22  36  27
Singapore  51  67  57
Taiwan Province of China  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Malaysia  49  64  49
Sources: WDR (various issues) and UNU/INTECH.
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Science and technology parks
Among the NIEs, the Republic of Korea was the first that set up an S&T
park, followed by Singapore and Taiwan Province of China (see table 25).  While the
S&T parks in the Republic of Korea specifically cater for R&D, the ones in Singapore
and Taiwan Province of China are mainly focused on high-tech manufacturing.  The
typical activities in the three S&T parks in Malaysia are high-tech manufacturing,
R&D and software and IT services.  Although the first S&T park in the Republic of
Korea was established earlier than the one in Taiwan Province of China, today the
latter is regarded as the only one in the world that has successfully replicated the
Table 24.  Malaysia:  Performance of high-technology exports
(millions of US dollars)
Exports  Share (per cent) Ratio to the Ratio to the world
United States
1990  6 050  38.2 0.07 0.016
1995  25 409  46.1 0.20 0.034
2000  38 335  57.3 0.20 0.039
Source: Extracted from Mani (2002).
Table 25.  Science and technology parks
Republic of Korea • Daeduck Science Park (DSP).  Established in 1973.
Occupies 27 square kilometres.  Caters to R&D.
• Ansan Technopark (ANTP).  Established in 1998.
Occupies 110,000 square metres.  Caters to R&D.
Singapore • Singapore Science Park (SSP).  Established in 1981.
Occupies 30 hectares.  Caters to high-tech manufacturing.
Taiwan Province of China • Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park (HSIP).  Established in 1981.
Occupies 580 hectares.  Caters to high-tech manufacturing.
• Tainan Science-Based Industrial Park (TSIP).  Established in 2000.
Occupies 680 hectares.  Cater to high-tech manufacturing.
Malaysia • Kulim High-Tech Park (KHTP).  Established in 1993.
Occupies 1,486 hectares.  Caters to high-tech manufacturing.
• Technology Park Malaysia (TPM).  Established in 1995.
Occupies 120 acres.  Caters to R&D.
• Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC).  Established in 1996. Occupies
750 square kilometres (takes 20 years for the full implementation
and execution).  Caters to software and IT services.
Sources: S&T park administrations of the respective countries.
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Silicon Valley in the United States (Lubman, 1999; Saxenian, 2000).  As shown in
table 26, the progress of the HSIP has indeed been ahead of the others.
The success of the HSIP can be attributed to active Government involvement,
rapid accumulation of knowledge and skills, and specific focus on manufacturing and
demand-motivated R&D (Xue, 1997).  Saxenian (1999) explains that its dynamism is
due to the increasing interdependencies between Silicon Valley in the United States
and Hsinchu-Taipei in Taiwan Province of China.  A community of United States-
educated Taiwan Province of China engineers has coordinated a decentralized process
of reciprocal technological upgrading by transferring capitals, skills, and know-how,
and facilitating collaborations between specialist producers in the two regions.  In
fact, over 40 per cent of the start-up companies in the HSIP are owned by these
engineer-entrepreneurs (Chan, 2001).
Contrary to the HSIP, the DSP is more domestically oriented and there is no
deliberate effort to attract foreign companies to locate there.  Its positive aspects
include a good physical environment, emerging spin-off companies and high-quality
research and educational activities, while its negative aspects are limited collaborative
research among the institutions, no synergistic effects among research institutions and
few linkages between the institutions and local industries.  Also, there is not much
industrial activity in the park as most of the tenants are government laboratories
(Shin, 2001).
According to Kahaner (1995), there are three similarities between the S&T
parks in Malaysia and the NIEs.  First, they have become a new strategy to develop
S&T and ensure a rapid transfer of R&D results to high-tech industries.  Second,
Government plays the leading role in promoting their development.  These include
providing funds for infrastructure building and offering various tax incentives to the
Table 26.  Progress made by science and technology parks
Turnover  Number of  Number of Number of
(US$ billion)  tenants  institutions* employed
 1990 2000 1990  2000 1990  2000  2000
DSP  n.a.  n.a.  43  86  22  33  15 000
ANTP  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  40  n.a.  7  n.a.
HSIP  2.2 21.7  121  292  18  23  75 000
SSP  n.a. n.a.  67  307  15  19  7 000
MSC  n.a. 0.9  n.a.  429  n.a.  53  13 000
KHTP  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  24  n.a.  1  n.a.
TPM  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  105  n.a.  4  n.a.
Sources: S&T Park administrations of the countries.
*  These include GRIs and public universities.
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tenants.  Third, universities play relatively minor roles in them.  This is in contrast
with the ones in the United States and Europe where universities are typically among
the key players.
Wang (2000) notices that although both the HSIP and SSP have strength in
physical and institutional infrastructure, FDI, venture capital (VC), overseas market,
technology, universities or institutes, high-tech talents and administration, their domestic
markets are weak.  Meanwhile, the MSC has strength in physical and institutional
infrastructures, FDI and administration, but its VC, domestic market, overseas market,
technology, universities or institutes and high-tech talents are weak.
Even if most of the key success factors are available in Malaysia, it still
faces stiff competition from other S&T parks in the region in attracting foreign
investors.  Especially with the entry of China into WTO, many world class high-tech
companies from the developed countries may consider shifting their investments to
the S&T parks in that country.
Foreign technology transfer
Foreign technology transfer is important to the technological upgrading in
Malaysia and the NIEs (Lim and Maisom, 2000; Carr et al., 2001; Keller, 2001).  As
shown in the Global Competitiveness Report (2002), Singapore recorded the highest
technology transfer index (1.95), followed by Malaysia (1.08), Taiwan Province of
China (0.90), and the Republic of Korea (0.82) in 2001.  The index is in fact positively
correlated with the FDI inflows to these countries (see table 27).
Japan and the United States were the two key FDI sources in the early
technological development of both Malaysia and the NIEs (Hobday, 1995; Banik,
2000).  However, due to increasing production costs in the NIEs (especially Taiwan
Province of China), they have gradually emerged as an important source of FDI for
Malaysia since the early 1990s (see table 28).  During the period 1980-2000, foreign
technology inflows to Malaysia were mostly transferred to both the electronics and
petrochemical industries via technical assistance and licence, trademark and patents
(see tables 29 and 30).
Table 27.  Net FDI inflows, 1970-2000 (billions of US dollars)
1970  1980  1985  1990 1995 2000
Republic of Korea 0.20  0.34  0.53  0.79  1.78 15.69
Singapore  5.58  7.21  5.46  3.67  5.22  6.37
Taiwan Province of  0.29  0.42  0.58  1.33  1.56  5.27
   China
Malaysia  0.04  0.19  0.13  2.33  4.13  5.22
Source: HDR (various issues).
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Table 28.  Source of foreign direct investment to Malaysia
by rank, 1980-2000 (millions of US dollars)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Republic of Korea  4  32  360  1 403 446
Singapore  96  288  1 220  4 195  570
Taiwan Province of China  17  57  3 611  6 159  293
Source: Malaysia Industrial Development Authority (2002).
Table 29.  Technology inflows by industry group,
1980-2000 (n.o.s)
Industry  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000
Electrical and electronics 16  21  41  25  48
Chemical products  21  17  24  22  25
Transport equipment  n.a.  n.a.  18  9  15
Fabricated metals  14  0  4  4  5
Food manufacturing  12  10  4  2  2
Rubber products  14  4  8  3  2
Non-metallic minerals  4  0  7  1  5
Basic metals  10  0  4  0  5
Textiles and apparel  5  1  7  1  2
Hotels  2  4  3  0  0
Plastic products  6  0  5  6  12
Wood products  n.a.  n.a.  6  1  0
Pulp and paper  0  3  4  4  1
Machinery  n.a.  n.a.  6  4  1
Beverages and tobacco n.a.  n.a.  10  1  5
Petroleum and coal  3  0  0  1  3
Leather  n.a.  n.a.  1  0  0
Miscellaneous  13  16  3  0  0
Total 120  76 155  84 131
Source: Five-Year Malaysia Plan (various issues).
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Both the externalization and internalization strategies for technology transfer
have been successfully implemented in the NIEs.  The externalization strategy adopted
in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China is aimed at restricting the
role of FDI, promoting inflows in other forms, and supporting domestic enterprises in
mastering increasingly complex activities.  Lall (2001), however, argues that such
a strategy is difficult and risky and few other countries can replicate it.  It requires
a strong base of technological skills, entrepreneurs who are able and willing to
undertake risky technological effort and an incentive regime that protects learning
while imposing export discipline.  Also, it needs a bureaucracy that is able to handle
these tools efficiently and flexibly without being hijacked by particular interests.
Meanwhile, the internalization strategy practised by Singapore is to rely heavily on
internalized technology transfer via FDI, but not to leave resource allocation and
technology to markets.  This requires the Government to target complex technologies
and induce MNCs to upgrade local functions.  Also, it calls for a strong skill base and
an administrative structure that is able to select technologies, target and bargain with
MNCs and handle incentives efficiently.
Despite the widespread perception that FDI plays a minor role in the Republic
of Korea development model, the country’s electronics exports started taking off only
when it became a final export platform for American semiconductor firms (Ernst
2000).  In fact, in the early 1970s, foreign firms accounted for one third of the
Republic of Korea’s electronics production and 55 per cent of its exports, before
falling below 30 per cent in the 1980s (Bloom, 1992).  Nevertheless, the Republic of
Korea has now one of the lowest rates of inward investment in East Asia, even after
the crisis-induced attempts by the Republic of Korea Government to bring foreign
Table 30.  Technology inflows by type of agreement, 1980-2000 (n.o.s)
Type of agreement 1980  1985  1990  1995 2000
Joint venture  22  9  15  3  0
Technical assistance  64  51  72  36  78
Licence, trademark and patents 8  5  36  26  43
Know-how  n.a.  n.a.  12  4  4
Management  6  6  5  1  0
Turnkey and engineering  n.a. n.a.  1  1  0
Services  7  1  6  5  6
Sales, marketing/distribution  n.a. n.a.  5  1  0
Supply and purchase  n.a. n.a.  2  0  0
Others  19 24  1  6  0
Total  126 96  155  83 125
Source: Five-Year Malaysia Plan (various issues).
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investment back into the country as a vehicle for accelerated technology diffusion.
Ernst (2000) attributes this to the increasingly demanding requirements by the
Government on foreign firms to contribute to local value added and increase the
transfer of technology.  By creating fears of a possible boomerang effect through
involuntary technology leakage, this accelerated the withdrawal of foreign firms that
faced increasingly stiff competition from the chaebol.
Each NIE has to a certain extent adopted somewhat dissimilar foreign
technology transfer strategies.  For instance, GRIs are the main facilitator in the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China but not in Singapore and Malaysia.
In the Republic of Korea, the chaebol with ready access to financial resources are the
main channel to transfer foreign technology via licensing.  Under licensing deals,
chaebol pay royalties for patent rights, as well as product, process and components
technologies (Hobday, 1995).  Instead of allowing foreign firms to establish local
subsidiaries and determine the speed and scope of technology diffusion, some of the
leading chaebol are encouraged to focus on learning and knowledge accumulation
through a variety of links with foreign equipment and component suppliers, technology
licensing partners, original equipment manufacturing (OEM) clients and minority joint
venture partners.  Meanwhile, SMEs that play the main bridging role in Singapore
and Taiwan Province of China and to a large extent Malaysia are seen to be leveraging
on the MNCs for foreign technology transfer.  Their home-grown conglomerates
and SMEs merely play a complementary role in promoting technology transfer
(Ernst, 2000).
Given that the progress of technological upgrading in Malaysia trails far
behind Singapore, this suggests that the former’s strategy lacks specific policy
instruments to engineer positive spillovers from the MNCs that mostly operate in the
manufacturing sector.  Actually, this can be attributed to its weak technology-based
SME sector that is of paramount importance to technology diffusion (Mani, 2002).
As pointed out by Amsden et al.  (2001), MNCs in Singapore are reputed to undertake
not only R&D locally but applied and possibly even basic research, although it is
typically Government-induced.  For instance, the Local Industries Upgrading
Programme in Singapore has successfully encouraged MNCs to adopt a group of
SMEs and transfer technology and skills to them.  This programme pays the salary of
a full-time procurement expert to work for specified periods with the adopted firms
and help them upgrade their production and management capabilities to the required
standards.
Thanks to the successful technological upgrading from OEM to original design
manufacturing (ODM) and original brand manufacturing (OBM), the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan Province of China are now less dependent on foreign technology transfer.
While Singapore and Malaysia still depend heavily on it for technological upgrading,
it is only the former that has rapidly moved up the manufacturing value added chain.
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Government research institutes
In the NIEs, GRIs act as the vehicle or gateway for their local companies to
access technology that would otherwise be beyond their capability.  For instance, the
Republic of Korea lacked technological capabilities for industrialization in the 1960s.
Besides imports of foreign technologies, the more radical solution was the establishment
of R&D institutes.  This had led to the establishment of the first GRI in 1966, namely
the Republic of Korea Institute of Science and Technology.  Meanwhile, in the 1970s,
Taiwan Province of China’s industry mainly comprised SMEs that ran on limited
capital.  This compelled the Government to establish the first technology research
institute in 1972, namely the Industrial Technology Research Institute, to carry out
innovative R&D technologies and transfer research results to the marketplace.
At present, Singapore has more industrial technology-based GRIs than Taiwan
Province of China and the Republic of Korea (see table 31).  While the difference is
insignificant, this suggests that the number of GRIs in a country does not necessarily
reflect its true technological capability.  This in fact explains the reason behind the
consolidation of 15 GRIs in the Republic of Korea under various ministries into nine
large research institutes under the Ministry of Science and Technology during the
1980s.
It is a statistical truth that Malaysia has more GRIs than the NIEs.  As
pointed out by Mani (2000), only two out of the existing 33 GRIs available in Malaysia
are devoted to industrial technology research, namely the Standards and Industrial
Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) and the Malaysian Institute for Microelectronic
Systems (MIMOS); the other two GRIs, namely the Malaysian Technology
Development Corporation and Malaysian Industry Group of High Technology, also
responsible for industrial technology development in Malaysia, only act as catalysts.
The functional roles of Malaysia’s GRIs are generally not very different from
those in the NIEs.  They generate new areas of technologies, provide a critical labour
pool to the industry, analyse industrial development, conduct and review feasibility
studies for new industrial technologies, collect foreign scientific and technology
information and encourage local industries to take up R&D projects in collaboration
with them.
III.  POLICY LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
National innovation system model
Taking a forward-looking perspective Malaysia may first adopt the
DFI-leveraging model, followed by the SME-PRI innovation network model and the
large firm internalization model.  Given that the second is in fact a pillar of strength
to the first, Malaysia may initially implement these two in Johor and Penang,
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Table 31.  Industrial technology-based GRIs in Malaysia and the NIEs
Republic of Korea • Republic of Korea Institute of Science and Technology
• Republic of Korea Electronics and Telecommunications Research
Institute
• Republic of Korea Institute of Industrial Technology
• Republic of Korea Research Institute of Machinery and Materials
• Republic of Korea Electro-technology Research Institute
• Republic of Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology
• Republic of Korea Institute of Oriental Medicine
• Republic of Korea Food Research Institute
Singapore • Data Storage Institute
• Environmental Technology Institute
• Gintic Institute of Manufacturing Technology
• Kent Ridge Digital Labs
• Institute of Molecular Agro-biology
• Institute of Molecular and Cell Biology
• Institute of Microelectronics
• Institute of Materials Research and Engineering
• Bio-process Technology Centre
• Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing
• Centre for Wireless Communications
• National Supercomputing Research Centre
• Centre for Signal Processing
Taiwan Province of China* • Industrial Technology Research Institute
• Electronic Research and Service Organization
• Energy and Resources Laboratories
• Centre for Measurement Standards
• Materials Research Laboratories
• Union Chemical Laboratories
• Opto-electronics and Systems Laboratories
• Centre for Pollution Control Technology
• Centre for Aviation and Space Technology
• Centre for Industrial Safety and Health Technology
• Computer and Communication Research Laboratories
• Mechanical Industry Research Laboratories
Malaysia • Standards and Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia
• Malaysian Institute for Microelectronic Systems
Sources: Ministry of Science and Technology (Republic of Korea), Ministry of Economic Affairs
(Taiwan Province of China), National Science and Technology Board (Singapore) and Ministry
of Science, Technology and the Environment (Malaysia).
*  All of the public research institutes and centres are organized and coordinated by the
Industrial Technology Research Institute.
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respectively.  After all, SMEs are an important nexus in the industrial cluster in the
former while the latter’s industrial structure is mainly dominated by MNCs.  Taking
these two industrial states as the test-bed, the two models can then be gradually
implemented in other states over time.  This would not only provide more policy
options for the Government to apply, but also help Malaysia to avoid taking the risk
of adopting a single model across all the industrial states.  Upon building a relatively
strong technological base, Malaysia may then start embarking on the large firm
internalization model.
Human capital
• Both the public and private IHLs need to reverse the present ratio of
science to arts students from 40:60 to at least 60:40.
• The composition of the coordinating body for training and skills
development needs to be more privately driven and governed, so that
more technical training programmes can be run as collaborative
ventures with MNCs or industrial training institutes.
• Strengthening the Government recruitment programmes and
introducing more liberal immigration policies are vitally important to
alleviate the brain drain problem.
Research and development
• The existing shareholding restriction that is presently imposed on
most of the R&D schemes needs to be lifted in order to promote
more foreign-based R&D activities.
• R&D expenditure by field of research ought to be in accordance with
the importance of the economic sectors and labour cost has to be
given the top priority in terms of R&D expenditure by type of cost.
• Strategic partnerships such as collaborative R&D ventures and
alliances are vitally important in spearheading R&D activities.
Science and technology parks
• More stringent rules and conditions have to be imposed in the process
of selecting tenants.
• Enhancing the interdependencies and collaborations between the S&T
parks in Malaysia and the NIEs is an effective process of reciprocal
technological upgrading.
• A private sector managed coordinating body needs to be set up to
promote strategic alliances between the S&T parks in Malaysia and
help form network linkages between their tenants.
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Foreign technology transfer
• The strength of a technology-based SME sector is the key success
factor.
• Malaysia is expected to be less dependent on it as the country moves
up the value added chain.  Therefore, it is required that the country
shifts its strategies from internalization to externalization so as to
restrict the role of FDI in mastering advanced technologies.
Government research institutes
• The present number of establishments is not sufficient and more need
to be established.
• GRIs have to be established according to scientific disciplines and
technological specialization so as to carry out R&D and transfer results
to the marketplace more effectively.
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
Both Malaysia and the NIEs have mounted elaborate strategies to identify
and act upon strategic technologies.  Without having strong strategic resources,
the results of these strategies in Malaysia have, not surprisingly, been less impressive
thus far.  Admittedly, the existing strategic resources are necessary and useful, but
might not be sufficient for the local technological upgrading to take off.  More
committed and concerted efforts are needed to strengthen each of these resources,
both structural and non-structural.  Given its sound macroeconomic fundamentals,
there is little reason for Malaysia not to succeed in this endeavour and to put it on the
path of technologically-driven development.
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